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INTRODUCTION
The recent shooting in Newtown, Connecticut, brought the need
for comprehensive firearms regulation to the forefront of American
politics. This shooting has received more attention than previous mass
shootings because of the ages of the victims. Currently, Congress is
fighting voraciously, with no compromise in sight. While this battle
wages in the national political arena, individual state legislatures are
also wrestling with the implementation of new firearms laws. But,
before the Newtown murders, the judiciary began placing restraints on
a legislature’s ability to regulate private use of firearms.
Most recently, in Moore v. Madigan, the Seventh Circuit held that
citizens have a right to carry firearms in public. That decision
overturned Illinois’s ban on private citizens carrying firearms in
public. 1 Until Moore, no court had held that there is a constitutional
* J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., 2003, University of Colorado. The author would like to thank his
loving wife, Melanie, for her support.
1
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F. 3d 933 (2012).
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right to carry firearms outside in public. Moore is the lineal result of
the Supreme Court’s holding in District of Columbia v. Heller, which
held that the Second Amendment provides a private right to selfdefense, which includes the keeping of operable firearms in the home.2
In Heller, the Supreme Court couched the right to bear arms in what it
called a core right of self-defense,3 thereby setting the stage for the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Moore.
This Comment will explain, that although untimely, the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Moore is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
recent Second Amendment holdings. The Seventh Circuit decision
gave short shrift to the Illinois firearms law, and faulted that legislation
because of its broad scope.4 However, the Seventh Circuit decision is
supported by the emerging Second Amendment test that courts had
adopted after the Supreme Court held in D.C. v. Heller that the Second
Amendment confers an individual right to self-defense.5
Part I of this Comment will first provide a brief background of the
Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment cases and the Seventh
Circuit’s Moore decision. Moore did not provide an in depth analysis,
leaving to the lower courts the task of determining the scope of the
right to self-defense. Therefore, in Part II, the Comment will explain
that lower federal courts have begun to use a First Amendment
corollary to analyze Second Amendment cases. That corollary was not
applied in the Moore decision, but it will be applied here post hoc. Part
III of this Comment will show that based on this framework Moore
was decided correctly, and will conclude by explaining how future
courts should continue to apply this standard to Second Amendment
cases.

2

D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 628.
4
Moore, 702 F. 3d at 933.
5
Heller, 554 U.S. 570; McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020
(2010).
3
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THE SUPREME COURT FINDS A PRIVATE RIGHT TO SELF
DEFENSE

The Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller in
2008, holding that the Second Amendment embodies an individual
right to bear arms in the home.6 Further, the Court singled out the
handgun as the “quintessential self-defense weapon.”7 Calling this
right fundamental, the Court found that the Second Amendment
merely codified what the founders knew as a natural right. The federal
government cannot infringe this right.8 Moreover, the Court held that
this right to self-defense is greatest in the home.9 Heller was authored
by Justice Scalia and shows originalist analysis and interpretation of
historical evidence. This decision has faced criticism for its refusal to
declare a standard that subsequent courts could apply in Second
Amendment cases.10
In 2010, the Court expanded its Heller ruling to include state
regulations as well. In McDonald v City of Chicago the Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment
applicable to the states.11 However, aside from acknowledging that
legislative action would require more than a rational basis review,12
neither of these Supreme Court cases applied a clear framework for
further judicial interpretation.
Dick Anthony Heller was a District of Columbia special
policeman who sought to keep a loaded firearm in his home for selfdefense.13 However, the District of Columbia banned unlicensed
6

Heller, 554 U.S. at 570.
Id. at 629.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Richard Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC (August 27,
2008), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books/defense-looseness# (calling
into question the Court’s use of the Interpretive rather than the Originalist
approach).
11
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010).
12
Id.
13
Heller, 554 U.S. at 574.
7
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handguns and made it unlawful to register a handgun.14 Furthermore,
the District required that firearms kept in the home be made
nonfunctional by use of a trigger lock, or other means. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the city’s total ban was
unconstitutional. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld that ruling; and
further, the Court held that the law requiring that lawful firearms be
made inoperable was unconstitutional.15
The crux of the Supreme Court’s analysis was divorcing the
Second Amendment’s operative clause, “the right of the people to bear
Arms, shall not be infringed” from the prefatory clause, “[a] well
regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State.”16 The
majority opinion stated that the prefatory clause did not limit the
operative clause grammatically, and therefore, the two clauses should
be understood independently.17 By framing its reasoning in this
manner, the Court could narrow its analysis to the meaning of the
operative clause. In this analysis, the Court distinguished militias,
which Congress can “call forth,” from Armies and Navies, which
Congress can raise and provide.18 According to the Court, Article I
assumes that militias are already in existence, essentially that citizens
would already own the weapons that they would use when the militia
was called forth.19
The majority held that “apart from the clarifying function, a
prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative
clause.”20 The court found support for this reasoning in the historical
evidence presented in amicus briefs and scholarly works.21 After
14

Id. at 570.
Id. at 635.
16
Id. at 576.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 596; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
19
Heller, 554 U.S. at 596.
20
Id. at 578.
21
Id. (referencing Volokh, The Common Place Second Amendment, 73
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 793, 814-821 (1998) see also, J. Tiffany, A Treatise on
Government and Constitutional Law.
15
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analyzing the operative clause, the majority’s opinion returned to the
prefaratory clause in order to “ensure that [their] reading of the
operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose.”22
The Court then determined that the Second Amendment protects
an individual’s right to armed self-defense in the home.23 The Court
found that the major flaw with the District of Columbia’s law was that
it banned “the quintessential self-defense weapon [the handgun] in the
place Americans hold most dear-the home.”24 Accordingly, the Court
held that that ban was unconstitutional the District of Columbia’s ban
on handgun ownership and the requirement that weapons in the home
be made inoperable.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the prefatory clause
should be understood as a preamble that limits the scope of the
Amendment and explains its purpose.25 In support of this reading,
Justice Stevens looked to various state declarations that were adopted
contemporaneous to the Declaration of Independence.26 He pointed to
these provisions in an attempt to show that the founding generation
felt that state militias were important to defense, and to indicate that
they were the main reason for adaptation of the Second Amendment.27
Justice Stevens concluded that the preamble sets forth the object of the
Amendment and provides its meaning28; “[i]t cannot be presumed that
any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.”29
According to Justice Stevens, the majority’s opinion conducted its
analysis in an unusual manner,30 and therefore denigrates the
importance of the prefatory clause.31 In a separate dissent, Justice
22

Heller, 554 U.S. at 578.
Id. at 592.
24
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2012).
25
Heller, 554 U.S. at 642.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 643 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
30
Id. at 644.
31
Heller, 554 U.S. at 128.
23
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Breyer whole-heartedly accepted Justice Stevens’ interpretation and
proposed an interest balancing approach.32
A. The Right to Self-Defense Cannot be Impinged by State
Regulation
In a 2010 decision, McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme
Court made Heller applicable to the states, holding that the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Court’s
Second Amendment holding applicable to the states.33 In McDonald,
the plaintiffs challenged a city ordinance that banned private
ownership of handguns within city limits. This case was the Supreme
Court’s first Second Amendment case post Heller, and in the majority
opinion, the court reiterated its previous holding and stated that
“[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from
ancient times to the present day… self-defense is the “central
component” of the Second Amendment right.”34
Once again, the Court reviewed historical evidence, and
recommitting itself to Heller, held that the core of the Second
Amendment is a right to bear arms in self-defense and that this right is
applicable to the States.35 Likewise, the Court looked to the legislative
history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded that
post-civil war legislation indicated that a main reason for the
Fourteenth Amendment was to guarantee that the newly freed slaves
would have the right to defend themselves.36 Because the Court had
determined that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right, “then
unless stare decisis counsels otherwise, that guarantee is fully binding
on the states and thus limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability
to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and

32

Id.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010).
34
Id. at 3036.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 3040.
33

344

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss2/5

6

Daniels: Keys, Wallet, and Pistol: The Seventh Circuit Establishes a Const

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 2

Spring 2013

values.”37 Moreover, the Court rejected an interest balancing approach
for Second Amendment cases.38
While stating that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right and
thus applicable to the states, the Court also acknowledged that this
right has limits. Quoting Heller, the Court stated, “that the right to
keep and bear arms is not a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”39
Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that circumstances exist where
even the core of the right could be infringed or limited: “our holding
[in Heller] did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory
measures as prohibitions…forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.”40
However, the Court did not make any rulings on whether the right to
self-defense extended outside of the home. The Court declined to
articulate the precise meets and bounds of the Second Amendment,
and therefore left much of the decision for lower courts to decide.
B. The Seventh Circuit Extends Heller
In Moore v. Madigan, the Seventh Circuit held that a right to selfdefense is as compelling outside of the home as inside. In so holding,
the Seventh Circuit held that an Illinois law that banned private
citizens from carrying firearms in public was unconstitutional.41 Under
Illinois law, citizens were restricted from carrying firearms outside of
the home unless they were police officers or licensed security
guards.42 There was no way for a private citizen to obtain a permit to
carry a firearm for protection, no matter how compelling her need for
it might have been. The appellants in that case argued that the states’
ban violated the holdings of D.C. v. Heller as made applicable to the
37

Id. at 3046.
Id.
39
Id.; see also D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 (2008).
40
Heller, 554 U.S. at 625-26.
41
Moore, 702 F. 3d 933 (2012).
42
Id.; see also ILL. Crim. Code. tit. 720 § 5/24-1 (2012).
38
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states by McDonald v. City of Chicago.43 The question before the court
was whether the Second Amendment confers a right to self-defense
outside of a person’s home.44 The court began its analysis with the
Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the Second Amendment protects
an individual’s right to self-defense, and concluded that a right to selfdefense is equally compelling outside of the home.45 The court
specifically faulted the scope of the ban, which prohibited most classes
of citizens from carrying firearms under most circumstances.46 Finding
that, “a ban as broad as Illinois [could not] be upheld merely on the
ground that it was not irrational.”47 Therefore, the court gave Illinois
180 days to implement legislation in compliance with its ruling.
Although the Illinois Attorney General petitioned for an en banc
rehearing, that petition was denied. The state had until July 9, 2013 to
adopt complying legislation; and on that day the legislature managed
to implement a bill over the Governor’s attempt to veto.
In Moore v. Madigan the Seventh Circuit expanded Heller,
holding that a right to self-defense is also applicable on the streets.48
Until the Seventh Circuit’s decision rendered Illinois’ ban void, Illinois
was the only state to have a complete ban on carrying firearms in
public.49
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion declared that the Second
Amendment’s right to bear arms does not end when a person leaves
their home, but instead follows them into the streets and throughout
their daily lives. Ironically, this ruling came only two years after
Justice Stevens dissented in McDonald and proclaimed that,
“[t]hankfully, the Second Amendment right identified in Heller and its
newly minted Fourteenth Amendment analogue are limited, at least for

43

Moore, 702 F.3d at 935.
Id.
45
Id. at 933.
46
Id.
47
Moore, 702 F.3d at 941.
48
Id. at 937.
49
Id. at 940.
44
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now, to the home.”50 In expanding Heller, Judge Posner, the author of
the Moore opinion, held that citizens have a constitutional right to
carry firearms for protection, stating that:
Twenty-first century Illinois has no hostile Indians. But a
Chicagoan is a good deal more likely to be attacked on a
sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than his apartment on the
35th floor of the Park Tower. A woman who is being stalked
or has obtained a protective order against a violent exhusband is more vulnerable to being attacked while walking
to or from her home than when inside. She has a stronger
claim to be allowed to carry a gun in public than the resident
of a fancy apartment building (complete with doorman) has a
claim to sleep with a loaded gun under her mattress.51
Although it can be argued that Moore was merely the logical
extension of the right to self-defense, the holding was far from a
foregone conclusion. Even Judge Posner, who authored the Moore
decision, had earlier expressed doubts regarding the soundness of the
Moore decision. In an article written for the New Republic shortly
after the Heller decision was handed down, Judge Posner lambasted
the Supreme Court’s decision, arguing that it was improvident, and the
situation was better suited for individual legislators to make:
The differences in attitudes toward private ownership of
pistols across regions of the country and, outside the South,
between urban and rural areas, are profound (mirroring the
national diversity of views about gay marriage, and gay rights
in general, as well as about abortion rights). A uniform rule is
neither necessary nor appropriate. Yet that is what the Heller
decision will produce if its rule is held applicable to the states

50

McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3120 (2010) (emphasis
added).
51
Moore, 702 F.3d. at 937.
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as well as to the District of Columbia and other federal
enclaves.52
Judge Posner further stated that, “Heller gives short shrift to the
values of federalism, and to the related values of cultural diversity,
local preference, and social experimentation. A majority of Americans
support gun rights. But if the District of Columbia (or Chicago or New
York) wants to ban guns, why should the views of a national majority
control?”53 Although he initially criticized the Supreme Court’s
decision, when presented with the opportunity to limit what he had
called Heller’s judicial interference with legislative intent, Judge
Posner chose instead to expand that holding. Although the Seventh
Circuit was bound by stare decisis to uphold the right to self-defense
in the home, there was no such precedent stating that the right to selfdefense extends outside of the home.
With its most recent holdings, the Supreme Court has established
a fundamental right to self-protection in the home and has stated that
that this right applies to the states through the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.54 However, these decisions left significant
room for interpretation by stating that the textual elements of the
Second Amendment “guarantee the individual right to posses and
carry weapons in case of confrontation,”55 while also acknowledging
that legislatures could place limits on possession and the carrying of
firearms.56
As this Comment will show, the court in Moore arrived at the
correct holding, but did not go far enough in its analysis. In Moore, the
Seventh Circuit explained that individuals are more likely to face
confrontation outside of the home than inside of it,57 and thus the court

52

Richard Posner, supra note 10.
Id.
54
See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010).
55
Heller, 554 U.S. at 591.
56
Id.
57
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F. 3d 933, 940 (2012).
53
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was compelled to expand the Supreme Court’s previous rulings.58
While the court did not mandate whether carry could be concealed or
open or which time, place or manner requirements would be
acceptable, it left no doubt that there must be a legal means for citizens
to carry firearms in public.59 Ultimately, the court found that a blanket
ban against any form of carry, concealed or otherwise, is
unconstitutional,60 thus establishing for the first time a right to carry
firearms in public.
The crux of the courts decision was Illinois’s complete ban.61 The
court was fully cognizant of the dangerous implications that may result
if citizens are given freedom to carry firearms in all circumstances.62
And, in rejecting the state’s empirical evidence, the court presumed
that Illinois will implement stricter requirements than the ones that the
state had cited to show the dangers of allowing public carry: “there is
no reason to expect Illinois to impose minimal permit restrictions on
carriage of guns outside the home, for obviously this is not a state that
has a strong pro-gun culture.”63 Likewise, the court listed permissible
instances where the invalidation of the law would have little effect on
carry.64 Specifically, the court mentioned the usual prohibitions of gun
ownership by children, felons, illegal aliens, lunatics and in sensitive
places.65 The court also stated that the state may implement
application requirements and that private institutions are free to ban
guns from their premises.66
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit articulated a
coherent approach for Second Amendment jurisprudence. In the case
of the Supreme Court, this was done purposefully—leaving the
58

Id. at 942.
Id.
60
Id. at 940.
61
Id. at 939.
62
Id. at 938, 39.
63
Id. at 939.
64
Id. at 940.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 941.
59
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judicial scrutiny to be determined by the lower courts. Likewise,
Moore did not clearly state a method for Second Amendment
interpretation; instead, it hinted at a per se unconstitutionality by
stating, “our analysis is not based on degrees of scrutiny, but on
Illinois’s failure to justify the most restrictive gun law of any of the 50
states.”67 In Moore, the court should have utilized the emerging
Second Amendment framework to reach its ultimate holding. Prior to
Moore federal courts had begun to implement a Second Amendment
test based off of the Heller and McDonald opinions.68 When this test is
applied to the Moore decision the result is the same: Illinois ban is
unconstitutional.
II. PRIOR TO MOORE COURTS HAD ADOPTED A TWO PRONGED TEST TO
RESOLVE SECOND AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
Neither McDonald nor Heller established a specific judicial test or
standard of review.69 However, the Supreme Court did provide some
general guidance, stating that more than rational basis review would
be necessary: “If all that was required to overcome the right to keep
and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be
redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational
laws, and would have no effect.”70 Moreover, the Court specifically
rejected the interest balancing approach that Justice Breyer suggested
in his separate dissent, stating:
“[w]e know of no other enumerated constitutional right
whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding
interest balancing approach. The very enumeration of the
right takes out of the hands of government-even the Third
Branch of Government-the power to decide on a case by case
basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A
67

Id.
See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (2011).
69
D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see Ezell, 651 F.3d at 705.
70
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
68
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constitutional guarantee subjected to future judges’
assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at
all.”71
Finally, the Court analogized its Second Amendment holding in
Heller to other First Amendment rulings: “[l]ike the First [the Second
Amendment] is the very product of an interest-balancing by the
people-which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew. And
whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home.”72 The Court used this analogy to
respond to Justice Breyer’s dissent, stating that:
Justice Breyer chides us for leaving so many applications of
the right to keep and bear arms in doubt, and for not
providing extensive historical justification for those
regulations of the right that we describe as permissible. But
since this is case represents this Court’s first in-depth
examination of the Second Amendment, one should not
expect it to clarify the entire field, any more than…our first
in-depth Free Exercise Clause case, left that area in a state of
utter certainty. And there will be time enough to expound
upon the historical justification for the exceptions we have
mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.73
Evidently, subsequent courts saw this repeated reference to the
First Amendment as a signpost guiding them through new and
unchartered territory. Therefore, despite the sparse guidance from the
Supreme Court, lower courts have begun to flesh out the levels of
scrutiny that apply in Second Amendment cases by using applicable
First Amendment analysis.

71

Id. at 634.
Id. at 635.
73
Id.
72
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A. The First Amendment as an Analogy to the Second Amendment
Similar to Heller, in Ezell v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit
analogized the Second Amendment’s freedoms to those of the First
Amendment.74 Noting that Heller did not specify “any doctrinal test
for resolving future claims,”75 the Seventh Circuit used the Supreme
Court’s prior First Amendment holdings in order to determine the
proper doctrinal test applicable to the Second Amendment.76 Ezell
was brought after the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald, and it
involved a challenge to the City of Chicago’s initial legislative
response to McDonald. Amongst other things, the city’s new ordinance
banned private gun ranges within its borders, while simultaneously
making range training a mandatory condition for handgun
ownership.77 The lower court held that the plaintiffs did not have
standing because they were not irreparably harmed and because they
could not succeed on the merits. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that the plaintiffs had standing to bring this cause of
action before the court.78
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit had to first determine whether the
plaintiffs stated a sufficient cause of action before preceeding on the
merits. Turning to the merits, the court first addressed the issue of
what standard or doctrinal test to use in its Second Amendment
analysis. Paraphrasing McDonald, the court reasoned that:
when state-or local government action is challenged the focus
of the original-meaning inquiry is carried forward in time; the
Second Amendment’s scope as a limitation on the States
depends on how the right was understood when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified...this wider historical
lens is required if we are to follow the Court’s lead in
74

Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (2011).
Id. at 701.
76
Id. at 702, 704.
77
Id. at 705.
78
Id. at 693.
75

352
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resolving questions about the scope of the Second
Amendment by consulting its original public meaning as both
a starting point and an important constraint on the analysis”79
For the court, original meaning acted both as a starting point
and as a constraint on its analysis.80
Looking to Heller for guidance, the court found that that the case
lacked “any doctrinal test for resolving future claims.”81 And
analogizing the Second Amendment to the First Amendment, the court
determined that because the Supreme Court had already laid a
framework for a “scope” inquiry in some First Amendment82
challenges to state action, this framework could also serve to analyze
“scope” in Second Amendment cases.83 Therefore, in Ezell, the court
applied this First Amendment framework to analyze the facts of a
Second Amendment case.
Applying this analysis, the Seventh Circuit first looked at
Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court had previously
determined that certain “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problems,” exist.84 Among these
unprotected classes of speech are fraud, defamation, incitement and
speech integral to criminal conduct.85 Moreover, when the Court has
“identified categories of speech as fully outside the protection of the
First Amendment, it has not been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit
analysis.”86 Rather, the Court used history and legal tradition to
determine whether a type of speech falls within the First Amendment’s

79

Id. at 702.
Id.
81
Id. at 701.
82
Id. at 702.
83
Id. at 701.
84
U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct 1577, 1584 (2010).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1586.
80
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protection.87 Historically, speech that was obscene or defamatory has
never fallen within the scope of the First Amendment’s protections.88
Applying that same historical analysis to the Second Amendment,
the Ezell court found that both Heller and McDonald suggest that
some gun laws will survive Second Amendment challenges because
they fall outside of the scope of the right as publically understood
when the Bill of Rights was ratified.89 But, the onus is on the
government to show that the challenged law:
…regulates activity falling outside the scope of the Second
Amendment right as it was understood at the relevant
historical moment- 1791 [ratification of the Bill of Rights] or
1868 [ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment]- then the
analysis can stop there and the regulated activity is
categorically unprotected.”90 If however, the government
cannot meet this burden, the court must then “evaluate the
regulatory means the government has chosen and the publicbenefits end it seeks to achieve.”91 Courts must determine
how close the law comes to the core of the Second
Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden on the
right.92
In Ezell, the court determined that the city could not produce
historical evidence clearly indicating that the regulation was beyond
the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection. The court cited two
Seventh Circuit cases that applied intermediate scrutiny after first
determining that the state action infringed upon the Second

87

Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702.
Id.
89
Id. at 702, 703.
90
Id. at 703.
91
Id.
92
Id.
88
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Amendment right.93 The court added that this general framework had
been followed by the Third, Fourth and Tenth Circuits.94
In applying this framework to the facts before it, the court held
that firing ranges did fall within the “scope” of the Second
Amendment.95 Drawing on Heller and McDonald, “[t]he Court
emphasized in both cases that the central component of the Second
Amendment is the right to keep and bear arms for defense of self,
family, and home.”96 In Ezell, the court held that the core right to
possess firearms for protection implicates a further right to training
with those weapons.97After completing this two-prong analysis, the
court then turned to the proper standard of scrutiny.
The court synthesized the standards of scrutiny for First
Amendment cases into a framework for analyzing Second Amendment
cases:
[W]e can distill this First Amendment doctrine and
extrapolate a few general principles to the Second
Amendment context. First, a severe burden on the core
Second Amendment right of armed self-defense will require
an extremely strong public-interest justification and a close fit
between the government’s means and its end. Second, laws
restricting activity lying closer to the margins of the Second
Amendment right, laws that merely regulate rather than
restrict, and modest burdens on the right may be more easily
justified. How much more easily depends on the relative
severity of the burden and its proximity to the core of the
right.98

93

See U.S. v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (2010); see also U.S. v Williams, 616 F.3d
685 (2010).
94
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703.
95
Id. at 709.
96
Id. at 704 (paraphrasing Heller and McDonald) (internal quotations omitted).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 708.
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Further, the court stated that reviewing the city’s ban on all firing
ranges would require “not quite strict scrutiny.”99 Rather, in order to
overcome its burden, the city would have to show that civilian target
practice at a firing range creates such genuine and serious risks to
public safety that prohibiting range training throughout the city is
justified.100 The fact that the plaintiffs were all law-abiding citizens
whose Second Amendment rights were entitled to full solicitude under
Heller was integral to the court’s reasoning.101 Ultimately, the court
held that the right to self-defense also implies a right to remain
proficient in the use of firearms, and to have access to training
facilities.102 103 Moreover, a right to have a firing range so that a
citizen may remain proficient implicates a right to travel with your
firearm to get to the firing range. It also implicates a right to have and
to use a firearm outside of the home. Therefore, utilizing this test in
Moore would require heightened scrutiny. Extrapolating this holding
to carrying firearms in public, the Illinois concealed carry ban affected
every class of citizen. This was not a modest burden on the right to
self-defense; it was a severe burden on the core right because it
prohibited law-abiding citizens from protecting themselves outside of
the home.
Ezell is not the only federal case that has articulated a two-prong
approach to Second Amendment cases. While confirming the
defendant’s conviction for possessing a firearm with an obliterated
serial number, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that Heller
suggests:
...a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges.
First we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on
conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendments
guarantee…If it does, we evaluate the law under some form
99

Id.
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 709.
100
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of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes muster under that
standard, it is constitutional. If it fails it is invalid.104
Therefore, taking these precedents into account, one would
assume the Seventh Circuit would have used a similar test in deciding
Moore. Similar to Ezell, the Moore court was faced with a blanket
prohibition and a challenge on Second Amendment grounds.105 Like
gun ranges in Ezell, the prohibition in Moore effected citizens
irrespective of their standing in the community.106 Felons and lawabiding citizens were treated alike in Illinois’s ban on carrying
firearms. However, while the Moore court acknowledged Ezell, it did
not utilize the framework adopted by the Ezell court.107 And, while
holding that more than rational basis review would be required, the
court did not attempt to explain what level of scrutiny should be
applied.108 Below, the facts in Moore will be reanalyzed using the
more thorough two pronged analysis used by other federal courts.
B. Scrutinizing the Moore Decision
The court in Moore arrived at the correct ruling; however, the
opinion did not provide a clear method for emulation. In Moore, the
court seemed to rely predominately upon basic logic rather than
thorough analysis. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Second
Amendment to “guarantee the individual right to posses and carry
weapons in case of confrontation.”109 However, the Court has never
explicitly found a right to carry weapons in public. Yet, the Seventh
Circuit inferred a right to carry weapons in public, stating that “[t]he
Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a right to bear
104

U.S. v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2010); see also U.S. v.
Chester, 628 F. 3d 85, 89 (2010).
105
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F. 3d 933, 941 (2012).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 939.
108
Id.
109
D.C. v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008).
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arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as
inside . . . [t]he Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second
Amendment therefore compels us to reverse.”110 Because the
Supreme Court has indicated that the Second Amendment confers an
individual right to self-defense, the court stated that therefore “we
can’t…ignore the implication of the analysis that the constitutional
right of armed self-defense is broader than the right to have a gun in
ones home.”111
As stated, the Seventh Circuit’s Moore decision did not articulate
any level of judicial scrutiny, opting instead to base its decision on
“Illinois’s failure to justify the most restrictive gun law of any of the
50 states.”112 However, the court did state that Illinois would have to
provide more than a rational basis and show that its “sweeping ban”
was justified by an increase in public safety.113 Although the majority
in Moore did hint at many of the factors that were articulated in Ezell
and other cases, it did not do so systematically. In its opinion, the
court tersely passed over the empirical data and the history of the
amendment without specifically adopting it to the framework that had
been established. The remainder of this article will apply the judicial
test established in Ezell to the facts presented in Moore.
C. Carry Falls within the Scope of the Second Amendment
According to Ezell, the first step in Moore should have been to
determine whether the Second Amendment protects the carrying of
firearms by individuals.114 As previously mentioned, scope is
determined by looking to the amendment at the time that it was

110

Moore, 702 F. 3d at 942.
Id. at 935.
112
Id. at 941.
113
Id.
114
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2011). The court
acknowledged that the first step in some Second Amendment cases would be a
“scope” question.
111
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enacted.115 Here it is important to note some confusion created by
McDonald. In Ezell, the court stated that “when a state- or localgovernment action is challenged the focus of the original meaning
inquiry is carried forward in time; the Second Amendment’s scope as a
limitation on the states depends on how the right was understood when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”116 However, in Moore, the
court states that 1791, the year that the Second Amendment was
ratified, is the relevant year.117 The reason for this apparent
disagreement is likely due to the Supreme Court’s expansive opinion
in McDonald.
After declaring that it would be incongruous to apply different
standards depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or
federal court,118 the Supreme Court then spends a large portion of its
opinion in McDonald discussing the post-civil war implications of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The relevant year of inquiry is 1791;
however, in this circumstance it actually matters very little. This fact is
made clear by McDonald, first when the Court stated that
“incorporated Bill of Rights protections are all to be enforced against
the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same
standards that protect those personal rights against federal
encroachment”119 and second when the Court introduces evidence that
both the framers of the Constitution120 and the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment121 believed that self-defense was an important
reason for their respective actions. This history implies that the
relevant historical inquiry should focus on the drafting of the Second
Amendment, but the Court spends a significant portion of its opinion
discussing the post-civil war reasons for drafting the Fourteenth

115

Moore, 702 F. 3d at 935.
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702.
117
Moore, 702 F. 3d at 935.
118
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3035 (2010).
119
Id. at 3035.
120
D.C. v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 3037 (2008).
121
Id. at 3038.
116
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Amendment.122 Regardless of the year of inquiry, the underlying right
remains the same and is applied on the federal and state level with the
same level of scrutiny.123
An article written for the Washington Post’s blog is useful to
elucidate the changing interpretation of the Second Amendment over
time. The author, Ezra Klein, shows two photographs that were
pointed out to him by Professor Akhil Reed Amar of Yale Law.124
Professor Amar is a constitutional scholar whose work had been cited
in McDonald.125 According to Professor Amar, these paintings
illustrate the changing landscape of the Second Amendment’s
interpretation.126 And although he does not agree with the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Founder’s understanding of the right to
bear arms, he does ultimately conclude that “[h]aving guns in homes
for self protection is a very deep part of American culture.”127 The first
painting is by John Trumball, entitled “Death of General Warren at
Bunker Hill,” and it shows the founders battling the British at Bunker
Hill. Professor Amar claims that this painting depicts the original
vision of the Second Amendment:

122

Id. at 3038, 3048.
McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3098.
124
Ezra Klein, A History of the Second Amendment In Two Paintings, WASH.
POST (Dec. 15, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/12/15/a-history-of-thesecond-amendment-in-two-paintings/.
125
McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3020, 3029, 3074, 3041, 3039.
126
Id.
127
Id.
123
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The second illustration shows the Freedman’s Bureau where
newly freed slaves faced off against a mob of angry Klansmen with a
reconstruction officer standing in between them:

These illustrations help to clarify that although the actors may
have changed, each generation felt that the bearing of arms was a
necessary tool for an individual’s self-defense.
The Supreme Court reviewed the historical record in Heller and
stated that the right to self-defense is the core of the Second
361
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Amendment.128 Because this core right is fundamental, the right does
not shift. If a right is fundamental, then the only relevant period of
inquiry is when that right was written into law. Thus, the Court’s use
of historical evidence from a later time did nothing more than
elucidate the nature of that right.129
Establishing the appropriate historical period focuses the inquiry,
but it does not end it. In Moore, the court then should have identified
the “scope” of the right as understood by the Framers when the Second
Amendment was enacted. In deciding Heller, the Supreme Court was
faced with a regulation that forbade operable firearms in the home.
Therefore, its holding was appropriately limited to self-defense in the
home. However, in it analysis, the Court did make note of two
historical pieces of evidence that point to the proposition that the
carrying of firearms was understood to be included within the original
meaning of the Second Amendment. The court pointed to a Louisiana
case from 1850, State v. Chandler, holding that citizens had a right to
carry firearms openly: “[t]his is the right guaranteed by the
constitution of the United States, and which is calculated to incite men
to a manly and noble defense of themselves, if necessary, and of their
country, without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly
assassinations.”130 Likewise, the Court cited to a Georgia statute that
implored men that qualified for military service to carry firearms to
places of worship.131 These cases show that when the Second
Amendment was ratified, at least some people believed that it
conferred a right to carry firearms outside of the home. And as stated
by the Moore court, “one doesn’t have to be a historian to realize that a
right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense in the eighteenth
century could not rationally have been limited to the home. . . One
would need from time to time to leave one’s home to obtain supplies
from the nearest trading post, and en route one would be as much
128

D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008).
Id. at 616 (holding that the right to keep and bear arms was considered
fundamental to the drafters of the Bill of Rights).
130
Id. at 613 (citing State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850)).
131
Id. at 601.
129
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(probably more) at risk if unarmed as one would be in one’s home
unarmed.”132
If the respondents in Moore raised an alternative historical
analysis it was not repeated in the opinion. However, some evidence
mentioned in McDonald indicates that there was a belief that the right
to carry firearms outside of the home was envisioned by the Second
Amendment.
D. The Appropriate level of Judicial Scrutiny
Determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in Second
Amendment cases has caused the most differentiation between the
circuits when applying this test. Similar to the Supreme Court’s
previous holdings, the Moore court purposively eschewed judicial
scrutiny in arriving at its decision, stating that, “our analysis is not
based on degrees of scrutiny, but on Illinois’s failure to justify the
most restrictive gun law of any of the 50 states.”133 However, in its
opinion, the court did address a previous Second Amendment decision
that had been made by the Second Circuit. That decision held New
York’s requirement that individuals show “proper cause” when
applying for concealed carry licenses constitutional.134 In upholding
the law, the Seventh Circuit opined that Second Amendment cases
require a sliding scale of scrutiny based on the nature of the offending
legislations burden on the Second Amendment right. Although New
York’s law was one of the strictest in the nation, I would imagine
second only to Illinois’s, that ban was upheld using intermediate
scrutiny.
Rather than delineating a specific degree of scrutiny, in U.S. v.
Chester the Fourth Circuit argued that a sliding scale is the most
appropriate way to determine the applicable level of scrutiny. 135 In
Chester, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument for strict scrutiny,
132

Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (2012).
Id. at 941.
134
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2012).
135
U.S. v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (2010).
133
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stating “the level of scrutiny we apply depends on the nature of the
conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law
burdens the right.”136 The court referred to First Amendment cases as
illustrative examples, noting “a content based speech restriction on
non-commercial speech is permissible only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.
But, courts review content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations
using an intermediate level of scrutiny.”137 The court then held that
intermediate scrutiny was most appropriate; however, the court found
that Chester’s claim was not within the scope of the Amendment
because he had a previous conviction for domestic violence.138
According to the Fourth Circuit, in keeping with the First Amendment
corollary, the decision to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny is
determined by the nature of the challenged regulation. Although, the
Seventh Circuit differentiated Chester, if it had applied the sliding
scale analysis it would have determined that Illinois’s ban required
strict scrutiny.
Thus, in Moore, the court should have determined whether the
restriction was most similar to a content based restriction—requiring
strict scrutiny—or if it was closer to a time place and manner
limitation, which would require intermediate scrutiny. Reasonable
minds may differ, but facially a regulation that forestalls all lawabiding citizens from carrying firearms seems to favor a content-based
strict scrutiny analysis. Moreover, in Kachalsky v. County of
Westchester, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that this
type of ban would require strict scrutiny. There, the court stated,
“heightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that (like
the complete prohibition in handguns struck down in Heller) operate
as a substantial burden on the ability of law abiding citizens to posses
and use a firearm for self defense (or for other lawful purposes).”139
In Kachalsky, the Second Circuit also applied intermediate
scrutiny to New York State’s handgun licensing scheme that required a
136

Id.
Id.
138
Id. at 683.
139
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93.
137
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showing of “proper cause” before a license would be issued.140 New
York issued four types of carry permits; the first two were “shall
issue” permits limited to the home or a merchant’s place of
business.141 The third type of permit was also a “shall issue” permit
that was limited to certain professions.142 The final type of permit –
the one challenged in this case – was also a “shall issue” permit but it
required a showing of “proper cause.”143 Proper cause was not defined
in the statute but it had been judicially defined as “a special need for
self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community or
of persons engaged in the same profession.”144 For those seeking the
permit for hunting or target practice the license was issued on a limited
basis.145 However, for those seeking a general carry permit the
application process was rigorous.146 The plaintiffs’ applications had all
been denied, despite the fact that one of the plaintiffs claimed that her
status as a transgender female put her at great risk of violence.147
Kachalsky helps to clarify three important issues. First, it supports
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion by stating that carrying firearms outside
of the home must have some bearing in the Second Amendment.148
Second, the court acknowledged, but did not fully adopt, the First
Amendment analogy. 149 The court noted that this analogy has existed
before it was articulated in Heller,150 but stated that it would be
imprudent to apply the analogy equally.151 The court was specifically
referring to the plaintiff’s contention that New York law required prior
140

Id. at 84.
Id. at 86.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 87.
147
Id. at 88.
148
Id. at 89 (analyzing the scope of the right).
149
Id. at 92.
150
Id.
151
Id.
141
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restraint–censorship–analysis.152 Third, this case presented an apt
analysis of the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to Second
Amendment challenges.
Essentially, in Kachalsky, the court established that when a law
imposes a substantial burden on core Second Amendment rights,
“heightened scrutiny is triggered.”153 The court explained that
heightened scrutiny may be akin to strict scrutiny when it is applied to
laws that burden core rights,154 but that it is less than strict scrutiny, or
intermediate scrutiny, when the regulation does not touch upon the
core right. 155 After citing historical evidence to support this holding,
the court found that carrying firearms outside of the home did not
touch the core of the Second Amendment, and used intermediate
scrutiny to uphold the New York regulation.156
Kachalsky misconstrues the Supreme Court’s holding in Heller.
Kachalsky held that because New York’s licensing scheme regulates
carrying weapons outside of the home, Heller is not completely
relevant because it only applied to a ban inside of the home.157 While
it is true that Heller held that the need for self-defense is most acute in
the home,158 it is a stretch to presume that Heller means that the core
right of self-defense is limited to the home. In Heller the Court
referred to the Districts handgun ban and stated, “[t]his makes it
impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of selfdefense and is hence unconstitutional.”159 And although Kachalsky is
correct that the Court’s ultimate holding was limited to the challenged
activity -- self-defense in the home -- the opinion is replete with
language implicating a broader scope. In fact, the Court stated that the

152

Id.
Id. at 93.
154
Id. at 93.
155
Id. at 93-96.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 94.
158
D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
159
Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
153
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meaning of the operative clause is to “guarantee the individual right to
posses and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”160
In Moore, Judge Posner distinguished Kachalsky and stated that:
Our principal reservation about the Second Circuit’s analysis
(apart from, disagreement, unnecessary to bore the reader
with, some historical analysis in the opinion-we regard the
historical issues as settled by Heller) is its suggestion that the
Second Amendment should have much greater scope inside
the home than outside simply because other provisions of the
Constitution have been held to make that distinction. For
example the opinion states that “in Lawrence v. Texas, the
[Supreme] Court emphasized that the state’s efforts to
regulate private sexual conduct between consenting adults is
especially suspect when it intrudes into the home.” Well of
course-the interest in having sex inside one’s home is much
greater than the interest in having sex on the sidewalk in front
of ones home. But the interest in self-protection is as great
outside as inside the home.161
Here, it is important to further distinguish Kachalsky and the
regulation that the case addressed. New York’s law did not ban
handgun registration, but rather placed the burden upon citizens to
prove the need for carrying firearms. Even with the rigorous
application process, that law was less restrictive than the Illinois
law.162 Although the petitioners in that case were unable to obtain
unrestricted permits, there was no evidence that all citizens had been
denied such permits. While the opinion does not indicate so, there
could be individuals who were able to show the appropriate level of
proper cause. Perhaps—like Judge Posner’s Moore hypothetical163—
160

Id. at 592; see also id. at 584 (quoting Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation of
the Second Amendments meaning of “bear”).
161
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (2012).
162
Id.
163
Id. at 937.
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there is a female stalking victim that was able to obtain an unrestricted
permit.164 As Judge Posner points out, although New York’s law is one
of the most restrictive in the nation, it was still less restrictive than
Illinois’s law.165 In New York, citizens retain the right to carry
firearms, despite the difficulties that the registration process entails. In
Illinois, no citizen was allowed to legally carry a firearm in public no
matter how compelling their need. Arguably, the state has a
compelling interest to protect to the public; however, the means used
were not narrowly tailored to meet its ends. Illinois’s regulation placed
a severe burden on the core right of self-defense by prohibiting the
public from carrying firearms indiscriminately by all citizens.
Although the state did have a compelling interest to protect, the law
was not narrowly tailored to achieve that end because the restriction
burdened all citizens, not just those who presented a specific risk.
Therefore it would have failed heightened scrutiny had that analysis
been applied.
E. The Supreme Court Cases Settled the Question of Historical
Meaning
Heller left much to be determined by lower courts. However,
historical evidence was not one of those things. Although Heller has
been criticized for an overreliance on historical interpretation, most
notably by Judge Posner,166 the Court needed to determine the
historical record in order to give lower courts discretion to create a
judicial test, rather than constantly reevaluating the historical
understanding of the Amendment. Although judges are not
historians,167 in Heller it was necessary to interpret historical evidence
in order to determine that the Second Amendment stands for an
individual right to self-defense.

164

Id.
Id. at 931.
166
Richard Posner, supra note 10.
167
Moore, 702 F. 3d at 943 (Judge Williams, dissenting).
165
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In both Heller and McDonald the court conducted extensive
historical analysis, and gave no indication that it wished for lower
courts to replicate or interpret that analysis. In Moore, the parties and
the amici presented the court with a wealth of historical evidence,
which according to the court, sought to repudiate the historical record
utilized in the two Supreme Court cases.168 In response to this
evidence, the court states that “[s]imilar evidence…had of course been
presented in [] Heller”169 and that “[t]he Supreme Court rejected
[those arguments]. The appellees ask us to repudiate the Court’s
historical analysis. That we cannot do.”170
Accordingly, by refusing to review the historical evidence anew,
the Moore court gave appropriate judicial deference to the Supreme
Courts opinion. Likewise, subsequent courts should only look to the
historical evidence when absolutely necessary, and only when the
Supreme Court has not previously defined the challenged legislation.
While the dissent in Moore urged that courts must look at history for
every new Second Amendment challenge: “Heller’s approach suggests
that judges are to examine the historical evidence and then make a
determination as to whether the asserted right…is within the scope of
the Second Amendment.171 Although that statement may be true,
Heller had already indicated that public carry is consistent with the
right to self-defense.
In Ezell v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit had already
conducted an analysis as to when it is necessary for courts to review
history in Second Amendment cases.172 In Ezell, a city ordinance
disallowed private handgun ranges (even though the Chicago Police
Department and federal agencies did have ranges within the borders of
the city).173 The court urged that historical analysis hinges upon the
scope of the regulated activity: “McDonald confirms that if the claim
168

Id. at 935.
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (2011).
173
Id. at 693-701.
169
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concerns a state or local law, the “scope” question asks how the right
was publically understood when the Fourteenth Amendment was
proposed and ratified. Accordingly, if the government can establish
that a challenged firearms law regulates activity falling outside the
scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the
relevant historical moment…then the analysis stops there; the
regulated activity is categorically unprotected.”174 The court also
stated that when the historical evidence is inconclusive, then the courts
must look to the strength of the government’s justification.175 As
previously stated, Ezell misconstrued the relevant historical period;
never the less, the inquiry is still pertinent.
In Moore, the dissent admits that the historical record is
inconclusive, while still claiming that history supports a ban on
carrying firearms. In her dissent, Judge Williams urges that all courts
should interpret the historical record when faced with new Second
Amendment challenges.176 She urges the court to rehash the historical
arguments made in Heller, while at the same time conceding that there
was not a historical consensus on the issue of bearing arms in public.
Judge Williams explains: “So while there are a variety of other sources
and authorities, the ones I have discussed suggest that there was not a
clear historical consensus that persons could carry guns in public for
self-defense.”177 The dissent further concedes: “I do not mean to
suggest that the historical evidence definitively demonstrates that there
was not a right to carry arms for public self-defense at the time of the
founding. The plaintiffs point to other authorities that they maintain
reveal the opposite. At best, the history might be ambiguous as to
whether there is a right to carry loaded firearms for potential selfdefense outside the home.”178

174

Id. at 703 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3047
(2010) and D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-35 (2008)).
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Moore v. Madigan, 702 F. 3d 933, 943 (2012) (Judge Williams, dissenting).
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Id. at 946.
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Id. at 947.
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Without definitive historical evidence indicating that the right to
self-defense ends in the home, the majority was bound to a reasonable
inference based on the Supreme Court’s holding that there exists a
constitutional right to self-defense. The Supreme Court has settled the
historical questions regarding the core right of self-defense, and by
refusing to uphold Illinois’s blanket ban on carrying firearms based
solely on conflicting historical interpretations, the majority correctly
decided this case.
F. Determining Future Second Amendment Cases
The Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to selfdefense. This right extends to the states, and does not end when an
individual steps out of her home. When deciding Second Amendment
cases that call into question government regulations, courts should first
determine whether the challenged activity falls within the scope of the
Second Amendment and, if the activity does not fall within that scope,
the court’s inquiry ends, and the legislation is valid. However, if the
regulated activity does fall within the scope of the Second
Amendment, courts must look to the restriction and determine the
level of the burden placed upon the Second Amendment. The courts
should apply heightened scrutiny; closer to strict scrutiny in cases
where a severe burden is present and intermediate scrutiny when the
burden is less severe. But this too will allow courts wide discretion to
determine how severe the burden is. Although the Seventh Circuit did
not adhere to this standard when deciding Moore v. Madigan, the court
did arrive at the right result. Applying this standard to the facts of
Moore, we see that Illinois’s ban was a severe burden on the right to
self-defense. This regulation was not narrowly tailored nor the least
restrictive means to reach the compelling governmental interest of
preventing crime.179
Recently, a Tenth Circuit court decision held that the Second
Amendment did not protect concealed carry. In Peterson v. Martinez,
the court upheld a Colorado law forbidding non-residents from
179

Id. at 941.
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receiving concealed carry permits.180 However, non-residents could
openly carry firearms.181 The court acknowledged that a two-step
analysis is necessary, and found that the historical scope of the
Amendment is to be determined first.182 The court then found support
in Heller for it’s ruling that the Colorado regulation was
constitutional.183 In Heller, the Court stated “the majority of the 19thcentury courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on
carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second
Amendment or state analogues.”184 This holding does not conflict with
Moore. In Colorado, non-residents could exercise their right to selfdefense by openly carrying firearms, and the right protected by the
Second Amendment is a right to self-defense, not to a particular form
of carry. Nothing prohibits states from placing reasonable limitations
on where the right is exercised, but they may not completely outlaw
the exercise of the right. When conducting this inquiry courts should
avoid a reanalysis of historical evidence, as Heller has settled this
issue.
CONCLUSION
The meaning of the Second Amendment has changed over time
and for many it is still changing. Recently, the Supreme Court has
found that the Second Amendment was drafted in order to protect an
individual’s right to bear arms in self-defense. While acknowledging
that this right has limits, the Court left it to lower courts to determine
the boundaries of those limitations. The Seventh Circuit greatly
expanded that Supreme Court holding by finding an Illinois law that
banned all forms of concealed carry unconstitutional. However, the
Seventh Circuit eschewed any in depth analysis of the constitutional
implications, instead relying solely on the over-breadth of the
180
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offending law. But, the decision finds support when a coherent
analysis is derived from the emerging Second Amendment
jurisprudence confirming the Seventh Circuit’s holding.
Given the present national debate over gun regulation, it is certain
that Second Amendment challenges will continue to be litigated.
Perhaps soon, the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in a case to
further define or place limits upon the scope of the Second
Amendment.
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